The University Center for Regional Studies and Analyses is pleased to present an interview with Prof. Yorgos Christidis – a distinguished expert with long-standing contributions to the study of Southeast European political history and a lecturer in Comparative Balkan Politics at the University of Macedonia in Thessaloniki.
In the course of the interview, Prof. Christidis addresses key questions related to:
The main factors shaping Greek foreign policy toward the Western Balkans after the end of the Cold War;
Athens’ stance on Albania’s European integration process;
The long-term effects of the Prespa Agreement (2018);
The dynamics of Greek-Serbian relations after 1989 and Greece’s position on Kosovo;
Greece’s economic interests in the Western Balkans.
The conversation offers in-depth analysis and valuable insights for all those interested in the region’s development.
We thank Prof. Christidis for accepting the invitation of the UCRSA!
You can read the full interview below or watch it on our Facebook page.
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Hello and welcome to the channel of the University Center for Regional Studies and Analyses. I am Dr. Peter Stoilov and it is my pleasure to host today Professor Yorgos Christidis from the University of Macedonia in Thessaloniki. Professor Christidis is a leading scholar in the field of Southeast European history and comparative Balkan politics with a particular focus in Greek foreign policy. And today we will talk about Greek foreign policy towards the Western Balkans in the post-Cold War era.
Professor Christidis, thank you for joining us today. Let’s start our conversation by saying that Bulgaria and Greece are neighbours with deep historical ties and have enjoyed excellent bilateral relations in the recent decades, especially within the framework of the EU and NATO. But the regional context is challenging for the foreign policies of both countries. So can we start with a broader question? What have been the main factors shaping Greek foreign policy in the Western Balkans after the Cold War? Can we speak of a consistent long-term approach?
Hello, Dr. Stoilov. Thank you very much for the invitation. I’m really glad to be here. I will start if you allow me by a small comment on your introduction. Bulgaria and Greece have indeed very good relations. And the relations, I think, serve as an example to the rest of the region. We’re a difficult region, as you quite right pointed out. Greece and Bulgaria, who had a very difficult past, managed to achieve a historic compromise, a historic reconciliation, I would say, after 1945, and to build very close relations post-1991. Those relations can serve as an example because they can show to the rest of the region that despite the differences that exist, if there is a political will, states can overcome the differences and can move forward. Now, moving to your questions regarding Greece’s foreign policy in the Western Balkans after 1989. I think most people would admit that the end of the Cold War, the end of bipolarity in international relations, and more specifically, the dissolution of the former Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, or Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia more accurately, in 1991, caught Greece unprepared. Greece’s foreign policy became preoccupied in the first few years after 1990 with two particular issues. First one was the perceived expansion of Turkish influence in the post-Yugoslav space. And the second one, much more important, was the question of the so-called “Name Dispute”. In other words, relations with the state, which is today called North Macedonia. The diplomatic questions that arose from the name dispute with North Macedonia preoccupied Greece’s foreign policy more or less until 1995 and the signing of the so-called Interim Agreement of New York in September 1995. The agreement was a first-step normalization of relations between Greece and North Macedonia. However, without solving the name dispute. After 1996 especially, Greece would seek to develop its relations with all the post-Yugoslav states and also would participate and support all efforts for the regional reconstruction and reconciliation. Moving fast forward, in 2003 Greece, which back then held the EU presidency, initiated the so-called Thessaloniki Declaration that officially recognized that the Western Balkan state should join the European Union, which is very important, as we know, moment for the Western Balkans. Since then, Greece, in principle, is a supporter of EU enlargement in the Western Balkans. Greece has sought to develop relations with the states of the region. I must say that after the end of the 1990s, there was a very important flow of Greek investments in most of the regions of the Western Balkans. It’s a period that really relates to, let’s say, an expansion of Greek capital in South Eastern Europe, including the Western Balkans, that took advantage of the fact that especially in the 1990s, for example, German capital was much more focused in Central Europe, Russia. So there were opportunities for Greek capital to expand into the region, including the Western Balkans, and that happened from the beginning of the 2000s. 2010 and the beginning of the so-called debt crisis in Greece is also a very important date because it meant that Greece had to focus much on its internal issues, restructuring the economy dealing with the debt crisis. That affected both the presence of Greek capital in the region, including the Western Balkans, but also affected Greece’s image in the Western Balkans, as it did affect Greece’s image everywhere in South Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, the principles of Greek foreign policy did not change. Greece is a supporter of EU enlargement in the Western Balkans.
Thank you for this overview of the regional politics. But you mentioned some bilateral relations. Now let’s delve deeper into that. And as the popular saying goes, the Balkans have often been described as a “powder keg” So let’s start alphabetically with Albania. You mentioned the EU integration process. How has Greece positioned itself with regard to Albania’s EU accession process? Is Greece a supporter, a gatekeeper, or something in between?
We’ll begin by saying that Albania’s post-communist transition hasn’t been easy. In 1990, Albania was the poorest state in Europe and had a very difficult past. It had a “neo-Stalinist” regime, was the most isolated country in Europe. Its post-communist transition has been characterized by leaders with authoritarian tendencies, something that continues until today, and with the formation of a system with very strong nepotism and party political favoritism. And if you add to that the emergence of organized crime, it can give us an idea of how complicated is the picture concerning Albania. Greek-Albanian relations have not been straightforward post-1990. Greece certainly from day one of Albania’s transition has been present in Albania in many respects. Many Albanians became economic migrants in Greece. Until 2010, possibly more than half a million Albanians were working and living in Greece. There is a Greek, ethnic Greek minority in the south of Albania. And until 2010, Greece, the factor had become one of Albania’s closest economic partners in terms of foreign trade and investment in the country. Post-2010, relations changed because of the debt crisis. The debt crisis, as we said earlier, affected Greece’s image in the region. And Greece at the same time became much more preoccupied with its internal issues. At the same time, what we’ve seen concerning Greek-Albanian relations is that after the emergence of the crisis, we had something that existed for long in Albania but became much more evident post-2010. i.e., there is a bias that the Albanian elite has towards Greece that relates to a specific narrative they have concerning the past of Greek-Albanian relations. Now, this has complicated relations with Greece because we have a number of issues that are pending for resolution. For example, an agreement concerning the delimitation of the sea borders between the two states. It’s pending because there is an attitude of procrastination from the Albanian side, which obviously seeks to connect that issue with other issues that relate to the past. Now, there’s not a very helpful attitude, and certainly complicate relations with Greece, but also potentially complicate Albanian-EU accession process, given the fact that Greece supports Albanian accession to the European Union.
Thank you for your expert comment. But now let’s move from Albania to North Macedonia, which has always been a hot topic, should we say. Signing the Prespa Agreement in 2018 with North Macedonia was considered a diplomatic breakthrough not only for both countries but for the region as well. Now from the perspective of time, how do you access the long-term implications of the Prespa Agreement for Greek-North Macedonian relations? Have public and political attitudes in Greece changed towards Skopje?
Well, the Prespa Agreement was a compromise. Compromises are never satisfying for everyone concerned. In both countries, large segments of the population were not happy with the agreement. But the Prespa Agreement is useful to remind, it was a compromise in the sense that it satisfied some of the basic demands of each side. In case of Greece, it satisfied its position on the so-called “Name Dispute” by bringing about a change in the constitutional name of the country. In the case of North Macedonia, it satisfied issues concerning identity and language with recognition on the side of Greece of the ethnic Macedonian identity and the Macedonian language. The Prespa Agreement also is very important, not only because it settled some outstanding issues that would not allow for full normalization by that relation, but also it contains a second part, very important provisions for the development of a very close relationship between the two states. So it’s a very useful guide for how relationships would move forward. Even more importantly, the Prespa Agreement has a value in the sense that by settling, let’s say, political questions, it provides space to the two societies for the two people to come to know each other better and also to understand that they can agree, that they disagree about questions concerning, for example, history interpretation. But they can still work together and move forward together for the benefit of all. Relations with North Macedonia, as you mentioned, have been challenging. But how have Greek-Serbian relations developed, especially in light of Greece’s stance during the Yugoslav wars? OK, the Wars of Yugoslav Succession gave rise to the increase of the idea of Greek-Serbian friendship based on understanding by people that we have close religious ties, or that we haven’t fought against each other at critical moments. For example, the Balkan wars of 1912-13. But the notion of Greek-Serbian friendship is not historically correct. But nevertheless, it took shape and really became widespread in Greece during the 1990s. The culmination of that understanding of a Greek-Serbian friendship was NATO’s intervention in Yugoslavia in 1999, when Greece not only did not participate in any military actions against Serbia, but there were widespread demonstrations unique all over Europe against NATO’s military action against Yugoslavia. Post-2000 and the removal of Slobodan Milošević from power, relations have developed between the two states. Greece is a state that supports Serbia’s EU accession process. And also, with the opening of the Serbian economy, post-Milošević, there has been a considerable interest by Greek capital in Serbia. Greece also is one of the so-called five non-recognizers of Kosovo’s independence. And this is really important for Belgrade. Belgrade really values the position of Greece and the other four non-recognizers of Kosovo’s independence. But still, it is a fact that post-2012 and the political dominance of the Serbian Progressive Party and of Aleksandar Vučić in Serbia, Serbia has followed its unique, as we all know, foreign policy by, for example, developing a close, especially, relationship with Moscow, if I may say, which for Greece is very uncomfortable, given the fact that we follow a totally complete foreign policy orientation.
You mentioned Kosovo’s independence. Actually, what are the underlying reasons for Greece’s refusal to recognize Kosovo’s independence? How much of this position is shaped by ties with Serbia, as you mentioned? Or maybe there are some domestic concerns or, let’s say, broader international pressures?
Let me first start by saying that among the so-called five non-recognizers, Greece has been possibly the most amenable towards Kosovo. The last few years, we have regular political contacts with Kosovo in Greece. And those, let’s say, improved ties with Kosovo generated expectations in some quarters in Europe and elsewhere that Athens might break ranks with the other four states and recognize Kosovo’s independence. But this will not happen. Why? Because the reason that existed in 2008 when Kosovo declared its independence is still valid today, which is any possible recognition of Kosovo’s independence. There is concern in Athens that might affect Cyprus and might really lead to recognitions of the so-called illegal state of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. So Greece will not recognize, I would say, Kosovo’s independence and will wait first for a normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina and then will do it.
Thank you so much for your comment. But now, as we reach the conclusion of our conversation, let’s step back again and return to the broader picture and talk a bit about economy. What are actually Greece’s key economic interests in the Western Balkans? Are they in energy, in infrastructure, banking, or maybe entirely somewhere else?
Well, as I said earlier, post-2010 and the debt crisis in Greece, there was a contraction of Greek economic presence in the Western Balkans as there was elsewhere in South Eastern Europe. Now, since 2009, there is a concrete improvement in Greek economics. And we see that during the last few years, there is a renewed interest for Greek investments in the region, especially into areas, energy, where especially since the Russian invasion in Ukraine, there is a lot of discussion about interconnectivity and about reducing Europe’s dependency on Russian gas and oil. There’s a lot of discussion about building pipelines and pushing forward with interconnectivity and in the banking sector.
And in this regard, an interesting question is, what role do the Chinese investments in Greece play, such for example, as in the port of Piraeus? Do Greek and Chinese economic interests converge or maybe diverge in the Western Balkans?
China has made two important investments in Greece in the last 15 years. The first one is the one you mentioned, which is the acquisition by the Chinese company called COSCO of a majority share in Piraeus port, 67%. And COSCO has actually managed to transform Piraeus into the largest port in the Mediterranean concerning container cargo. The second investment concerns the acquisition by the China National Grid of the Greek National Grid, 26%. This is also very important investment. So we can see that Greek-Chinese economic relations are beneficial. Greece does not have the extent of, let’s say, Chinese attention that we can see in other cases in Southeastern Europe like in Serbia, for example, or further north, like in Hungary. Nevertheless, the relations are very much beneficial between the two states. But the relationship is symmetrical in many respects. China, as in many other cases, enjoys a huge surplus in trade relations with Greece. China is a global economic superpower. And in China’s interest in the region, as we know, go through projects like the Belt and Road Initiative, to which Greece participates. But still, in Greece, it is regarded as a very beneficial relationship. There’s also a very interesting aspect that concerns the perception that the two states have of representing ancient civilizations. And that really provides an extra dimension in the relations between the two states. And we see, during the last few years, a lot of contacts and cooperation in that area, cooperation between universities, the teaching of Chinese language in Greece, or an interest for ancient Greece and China.
This has been very intriguing. And your analysis has been quite extensive. You’ve helped us better understand the regional dynamics at play, and also the complexities of Greek foreign policy. So thank you once again for being our guest. And to our audience, please stay tuned and for more content from the University Center for Regional Studies and Analyses.
Thank you, Dr. Stoilov. Thank you for the invitation and for the interview. Thank you very much.