by Dr. Petar Stoilov*
Tel Aviv and Nicosia established diplomatic relations in 1960, when Cyprus gained independence, yet bilateral ties remained limited for the next four decades. They were shaped by Cold War geopolitics and regional priorities. Nicosia aligned closely with the Arab countries on the Palestinian question in exchange for Arab support on the Cyprus question. Israel, on the other hand, maintained military ties and a de facto strategic alliance with Ankara.
This paradigm began to shift in the late 2000s., with the deterioration of Israel-Turkey relations after 2008 and especially after the Mavi Mármara incident in 2010, which led to an open diplomatic rupture.
These developments coincided with major natural gas discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean, and also Cyprus reaffirming its importance in the Western political architecture after its accession to the European Union. All of this created a strategic opportunity for Tel Aviv and Nicosia to draw closer. Ever since then, Israel and Cyprus have rapidly deepened their ties across a range of sectors.
Energy Cooperation and Connectivity
Energy cooperation and connectivity have become a cornerstone of the Israel-Cyprus partnership and perhaps the most visible dimension of this partnership.
The Israelis found the Mari-B field in their waters in 2000, and more importantly, the Tamar and Leviathan fields in 2009 and 2010 while Cyprus discovered the Aphrodite field in 2011. By 2010, the two countries agreed on the delimitation of their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), thereby formalising a common maritime border between them.
At that point, Tel Aviv and Nicosia publicly discussed the possibility of constructing a pipeline to transport natural gas from the Eastern Mediterranean reservoirs to Europe via Greece and Italy, the so-called “East Med” pipeline.
Though complex and still under evaluation – given questions of technical feasibility, commercial viability, and broader geopolitical dynamics – the very idea of the EastMed pipeline already illustrates the depth of strategic alignment between Israel and Cyprus on energy matters. For both governments, energy is not merely a matter of commercial profit. It is a source of geopolitical leverage, a way to strengthen ties with the European Union by contributing to the diversification of Europe’s energy supply.
A current focal point of cooperation is the development of the Aphrodite gas field in Cypriot waters, located near Israel’s Leviathan field and extending slightly into Israel’s maritime zone. Importantly, Nicosia and Tel Aviv chose not to allow this overlap to become a political dispute. Instead, they adopted a pragmatic approach: the two governments left the small cross-border issue to be negotiated commercially by the companies involved — Chevron (Shevron), Shell, and Israel’s NewMed — ensuring that technical questions would not cloud otherwise excellent political relations. In February 2025, the Cypriot government approved an updated development and production plan that envisions sending Aphrodite gas to existing Egyptian liquefaction infrastructure. (The approved DPP includes a Floating Production Unit (also known as a gas processing facility) in the Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone and a subsea pipeline for exporting gas to Egypt for processing and liquefaction)
This plan aligns well with Israel’s own export strategy – Israel already supplies some gas to Egypt – and with Europe’s growing demand for diversified gas sources.
Beyond gas, Israel and Cyprus are exploring electricity connectivity that would further bind them to each other and to Europe. The most significant initiative is the planned Great Sea Interconnector: an ambitious undersea power-cable system that will connect Israel’s electricity grid to Cyprus (just this Israel-Cyprus segment is 330 km long) and onward to Greece.
The idea of connecting the power grids of Greece, Cyprus, and Israel is largely promoted by the European Commission and has been on the table for over a decade. The basic motivation was that because Israel and Cyprus are essentially energy islands, it is in their interests (for different, though similar, reasons) to create an energy connection between them that can help in emergency situations when one of the countries cannot supply all its electricity needs on its own. For example, the explosion at the (Mari) Vasilikos Power Station in Cyprus in 2011 and, more recently, the Iron Swords War in Israel have raised concerns about electricity shortages during crises.
For Cyprus, which has some of the highest electricity prices in the EU, the project could also potentially lead to the import of cheaper power from the European grid. Both governments, alongside Greece (which is a natural partner for practical and political reasons) and the EU, are now pushing to implement the project despite its technical complexity and cost (estimated over €2 billion).
Overall, Israel and Cyprus are positioning themselves as a new energy bridge between the Middle East and Europe. Yet this bridge extends far beyond energy. In September 2023 leaders met on the sidelines of the G20 summit in India to announce the creation of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, a major geo-economic and logistical initiative that would extend across the Eastern Mediterranean, notably through Israel and Cyprus.
However, the Hamas-led attacks against Israel on October 7th and the subsequent war disrupted this hopeful regional agenda.
Israel-Hamas War
From the outset of the conflict, Cyprus positioned itself as a neutral yet proactive actor focused on humanitarian relief and de-escalation. It has also been reported that during periods of heightened tension, Nicosia quietly conveyed messages between Iran and Israel when asked to do so – an illustration of its ability to speak with all sides when few others can.
In October 2024, Cyprus hosted the 11th MED9 Summit – also known as EU Med – which brings together nine EU Mediterranean states: Croatia, Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain. The successful summit reinforced Cyprus’s standing as a stabilising force in an increasingly volatile Mediterranean region.
As the closest EU member state to Gaza, Cyprus took the lead in shaping a humanitarian response. The Cypriot government launched the “Amalthea” initiative, proposing a maritime corridor to channel aid directly from Cyprus to the Gaza Strip at a time when overland deliveries were severely constrained. After months of coordination, the EU, the United States, and regional partners formally endorsed the proposal, and in March 2024 the first pilot aid shipments sailed from Cyprus to Gaza. The Amalthea corridor demonstrated how Cyprus could leverage both its geography – only 400 kilometres from Gaza – and its trusted relations with all sides to deliver life-saving assistance. Cypriot officials worked closely with Israel to ensure security checks for shipments , while also gaining trust from Arab leaders that the aid would reach Palestinian civilians – a balancing act few others could manage.
With the initiative proving successful, President Nikos Christodoulides announced that Cyprus stands ready to use its strategic position to contribute to Gaza’s future. This includes repurposing the corridor for reconstruction efforts: using Cyprus as a hub for removing rubble from devastated areas and shipping in building materials needed to rebuild homes and essential infrastructure.
Cyprus even signaled willingness to contribute to a proposed international stabilization force for Gaza and to train Palestinian security forces, if such steps become part of the peace process. As President Christodoulides emphasised, “this is the role Cyprus can play”- drawing on its geography, credibility, and wide network of relationships to support peace, recovery, and long-term stability in the Middle East.
Looking ahead to its assumption of the rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union in 2026, Cyprus seeks to institutionalise this bridge role between Europe and the Middle East and leverage its unique position to support dialogue, cooperation, and long-term stability in the region.
*The analysis was presented on 9 December 2025 at the round table “Geostrategic Developments in the Eastern Mediterranean and Efforts for Regional Cooperation,” organized by the Embassy of the Republic of Cyprus and the Faculty of History at Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski.”